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                             OPINION 
                                            
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
         Plaintiff-appellant Barbara A. Coleman appeals an order 
of the district court granting defendant-appellee Monmouth County's 
posttrial motion to vacate a jury verdict of $15,000 in 
compensatory damages and $350,000 in punitive damages based upon 
three findings of intentional sex discrimination.  The principal 
questions we must decide are whether county prosecutors in New 
Jersey act as state or county officials when they make personnel 
decisions and whether the district court properly exercised in 
personam jurisdiction.  We hold that county prosecutors act on 
behalf of the county in this setting.  We further hold that the 
County of Monmouth has waived any defense of lack of personal 
jurisdiction.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1).  Accordingly, we will 
reverse the May 4, 1995 order of the district court vacating the 
jury verdict against the County of Monmouth.      
         The jury also found Prosecutor Kaye to be liable in his 
individual capacity for $10,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 
in punitive damages.  Kaye appeals the district court's denial of 
his Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law on the ground 
of evidentiary insufficiency.  As we find sufficient evidence in 
the record to support a finding of liability against Kaye for both 
compensatory and punitive damages, we will affirm the district 
court's denial of Kaye's motion.  Furthermore, since the jury 
verdict against the County of Monmouth must be reinstated, 
liability for the payment of attorneys' fees must be apportioned 
between Kaye and the County of Monmouth, and we will remand the 
matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
                                I. 
         Barbara Coleman was employed as an investigator at the 
Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office during John Kaye's tenure as 
Monmouth County Prosecutor.  As County Prosecutor, Kaye had plenary 
authority in deciding whom to hire, fire, promote or demote at the 
Monmouth County Office.  Although Kaye received input from 
subordinates as to the qualifications of persons considered for 
promotion, it is uncontested that he possessed the final authority 
to determine who worked for the Monmouth County Prosecutor and in 
what capacity.   
         Coleman applied for promotions at the Monmouth County 
Prosecutor's Office in May of 1989, June of 1990 and October of 
1990.  In May of 1989 Coleman sought to be promoted to either 
sergeant or lieutenant.  She was not promoted to either position.  
Similarly, Coleman's applications to be promoted to sergeant were 
denied in both June and October of 1990.  On all three occasions, 
a male investigator was promoted over Coleman.   
         On March 12, 1991, Coleman filed a complaint in the 
District Court for the District of New Jersey naming as parties 
John Kaye, individually and in his official capacity as Monmouth 
County Prosecutor, the County Prosecutor's Office of the County of 
Monmouth, John Does 1-100 and Jane Does 1-100.  The County of 
Monmouth was not named separately as a defendant.  The complaint 
alleged that the defendants had discriminated against Coleman based 
upon her sex by failing to promote her to sergeant (three times) 
and lieutenant (once) on various occasions in 1989 and 1990.  
Coleman brought claims under 42 U.S.C.  1983, Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.  2000e et seq., and pendent 
state claims under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination 
("LAD"), N.J. Stat. Ann.  10:5-1 et seq.  The summons and complaint 
were served upon Kaye, who also accepted service on behalf of the 
Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office. 
         This matter proceeded to trial in district court on 
September 20, 1994.  On September 29, 1994, the case was sent to 
the jury, which made the following pertinent factual findings:  (1)  
Prosecutor Kaye had intentionally discriminated against Coleman 
based upon her sex by not promoting her to sergeant in June of 1990 
and October of 1990;  (2)  the County of Monmouth did not adopt a 
policy or custom of sex discrimination that resulted in Coleman not 
being promoted in May of 1989, June of 1990 or October of 1990;  
(3) Kaye and/or one or more of his subordinates who made 
recommendations to him intentionally discriminated against Coleman 
because she was a woman, and such discrimination proximately caused 
her to be passed over for promotion in May of 1989, June of 1990 
and October of 1990;  and (4) Kaye and/or one of his subordinates 
did not intentionally discriminate against Coleman in retribution 
for her filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission ("EEOC").  The jury's award of compensatory and punitive 
damages against both the County of Monmouth and Prosecutor Kaye was 
based upon these findings.  The verdict sheet that the district 
court submitted to the jury to record its findings provided no 
separate section in which it could articulate the precise grounds 
upon which the parties had been held liable.   
         Faced with the prospect of paying a substantial damages 
award, the County of Monmouth filed a motion to intervene pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, which was granted by the district court.  
Monmouth County also filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.60(b)(4) to 
vacate the jury verdict.  The County argued that the 
jury verdict should be vacated because Coleman had not properly 
effected service of process upon the County.  It also contended 
that Prosecutor Kaye is a state official over whom the County 
exercised no control.  Monmouth County maintained that New Jersey 
law requires a finding of "control" in order for it to be held 
liable in damages under the LAD.  The County argued that since it 
had no control over Kaye's personnel decisions, then a fortioricounty 
prosecutors in New Jersey are not agents of the counties 
they serve.  Thus, Monmouth County argued that even if county 
prosecutors engage in acts of intentional discrimination against 
their own employees, such conduct nonetheless cannot expose the 
counties to liability under the LAD.    
         The district court found the County of Monmouth's 
arguments to be convincing and granted its motion to vacate 
Coleman's jury verdict against the County on two alternative 
grounds.  The district court held that it had lacked in 
personamjurisdiction to enter a judgment against the County of Monmouth 
because it had not been served properly under either Fed. R. Civ. 
P.4(j)(2) or N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(a)(8), the local procedural rule to 
which Rule 4(j) refers.  Alternatively, the district court found 
that the County of Monmouth could not be held liable under the New 
Jersey LAD premised upon a theory of respondeat superior for the 
actions of Prosecutor Kaye.  Applying the agency principles adopted 
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 
626 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993), the district court held that there was no 
master/servant relationship between the County of Monmouth and 
Prosecutor Kaye.  On the contrary, the district court concluded 
that "county prosecutors are controlled by the Attorney General for 
the State of New Jersey[,] a member of the New Jersey executive 
branch of government."  Coleman v. Kaye, No. 91-1140, slip op. at 
7 (D.N.J. May 4, 1995). 
         Prosecutor Kaye responded to the October 17, 1994 jury 
verdict against him by filing a Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) motion for 
judgment as a matter of law, arguing that there was insufficient 
evidence in the record to support a finding that he had 
discriminated against Coleman.  Kaye also argued that there was an 
insufficient foundation in the record to support an award of either 
compensatory or punitive damages against him.  The district court 
denied Kaye's Rule 50(b) motion in its May 4, 1995 order. 
         On September 7, 1995, the district court granted 
Coleman's application for attorneys' fees and costs.  The order 
provided that Coleman's counsel be awarded $101,184.00 in 
attorneys' fees and $3,968.92 in costs.  Since the County of 
Monmouth had already been dismissed from this action, Prosecutor 
Kaye was ordered to pay the entire sum of $105,152.92.  This appeal 
followed. 
 
                               II. 
         The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
 1331, 28 U.S.C.  1343(a)(3) and 28 U.S.C.  1367.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over jurisdictional issues.  Anthuis v. Colt Indus. Operating 
Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1002 (3d Cir. 1992).  Our review of the 
district court's interpretation and application of state law is 
plenary, Hofkin v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 365, 
369 (3d Cir. 1996), as is our review of a denial of a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law.  Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 
4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993).  A Rule 50(b) "motion should be 
granted only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and 
reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a 
jury reasonably could find liability."  Id. 
         Punitive damages may be awarded for violation of the New 
Jersey LAD "when the wrongdoer's conduct is especially egregious."  
Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 464 (N.J. 1993) 
(quoting Leimgruber v. Claridge Assocs., 375 A.2d 652, 654 (N.J. 
1977)).  Therefore, "the employer should be liable for punitive 
damages only in the event of actual participation by upper 
management or willful indifference."  Id.  Similarly, punitive 
damages may be awarded under 42 U.S.C.  1983 "when the defendant's 
conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when 
it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally 
protected rights of others."  Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 
S. Ct. 1625, 1640 (1983). 
         "We review the reasonableness of an award of attorney's 
fees for an abuse of discretion."  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 
1177, 1182 (3d Cir. 1990).  Our review is plenary "when a district 
court fails to apply the appropriate standards for granting legal 
fees . . . ."  Board of Trustees of Trucking Employees of North 
Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc.-Pension Fund v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 508 
(3d Cir. 1992).    
 
                               III. 
         Although Coleman's suit against the County of Monmouth 
and Prosecutor Kaye arose from the same underlying facts, the 
claims that the defendants raise on appeal require the resolution 
of entirely different issues.  We will therefore address their 
various contentions in separate sections.  First, we will address 
Coleman's appeal, which assails the two grounds upon which the 
district court vacated the jury verdict against the County of 
Monmouth.  
                                A. 
         The district court relied upon Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2) and 
New Jersey Court Rule 4:4-4(a)(8) to support its conclusion that 
the court lacked in personam jurisdiction over Monmouth County.  
Rule 4(j)(2) provides that 
         [s]ervice upon a state, municipal corporation, 
         or other governmental organization subject to 
         suit shall be effected by delivering a copy of 
         the summons and of the complaint to its chief 
         executive officer or by serving the summons 
         and complaint in the manner prescribed by the 
         law of that state for the service of summons 
         or other like process upon any such defendant. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2).  The manner of service prescribed under the 
local New Jersey rules is set forth in N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(a)(8), 
which provides, in relevant part, that service must be effected "by 
serving a copy of the summons and complaint . . . on the presiding 
officer or on the clerk or secretary thereof."  Reading these two 
provisions together, the district court concluded that since Kaye 
"is not the presiding officer, clerk or secretary of the County of 
Monmouth . . . plaintiff did not properly effect service of the 
summons and complaint upon the County of Monmouth."  Coleman v. 
Kaye, No. 91-1140, slip op. at 4 (D.N.J. May 4, 1995).  As such, 
the court concluded that "the jury's verdict . . . against the 
County of Monmouth cannot stand."  Id. 
         The district court was correct to the extent that it 
concluded that Kaye did not fit the proper description of anyone 
designated to receive service of process on behalf of the County of 
Monmouth under either Rule 4(j) or N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(a)(8).  
Moreover, as we explained in Grand Entertainment Group, Ltd. v. 
Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 492 (3d Cir. 1993), "[a] 
district court's power to assert in personam authority over parties 
defendant is dependent not only on compliance with due process but 
also on compliance with the technicalities of Rule 4."  This 
analysis is not controlling, however, when a party submits itself 
to the jurisdiction of the district court, thereby waiving any 
claim that the district court lacked in personam jurisdiction.  SeeFed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(h)(1).  This is exactly what happened here. 
         The County of Monmouth became involved in this lawsuit 
both before and after Coleman filed her complaint in district 
court.  For example, before commencing the present action in 
district court, Coleman submitted a complaint to the EEOC.  
Monmouth County elected to respond to Coleman's EEOC complaint.  
Assistant Monmouth County Counsel Robert Hrebek sent a letter to 
Joe G. Rosenberg, the Supervisory Investigator of the EEOC, 
advising him that Hrebek had "been assigned to handle [this matter] 
on behalf of the Monmouth County Prosecutor by Malcolm V. Carton, 
Esq., Monmouth County Counsel. . . [and to] please direct all 
future correspondence in this case to my attention as Assistant 
County Counsel."  App. at 145. 
         After Coleman filed her complaint, Special County Counsel 
Richard T. O'Connor sent a letter, dated August 12, 1993, to the 
clerk of the court.  In this letter, O'Connor requested the clerk 
to 
         enter the appearance of the firms of Gerald L. 
         Dorf, P.C. and Malcolm V. Carton, Monmouth 
         County Counsel, by Richard T. O'Connor, 
         Special County Counsel, on behalf of 
         Defendants John Kaye individually and in his 
         capacity as Monmouth County Prosecutor and the 
         County Prosecutor's Office of the County of 
         Monmouth in the above-captioned matter. 
 
Id. at 141.  The August 12, 1993 letter listed both O'Connor and 
Dorf as "Attorneys for Defendants John Kaye and the County 
Prosecutor's Office of the County of Monmouth."  Id.   
         At no time did representatives from the County Counsel's 
Office ever interpose an objection on jurisdictional grounds.  See5A 
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice And Procedure  
1344, at 173 (2d ed. 1990) ("If defendant appears in the action, he 
must interpose any . . . objections he may have by motion or in his 
answer or they will be deemed waived by virtue of Rule 12(h)(1).").  
Quite to the contrary, the representations made by attorneys from 
the County Counsel's Office indicate that Monmouth County was 
acutely aware of its possible exposure in this matter.  To 
illustrate, a letter dated March 3, 1992 sent by Special County 
Counsel O'Connor to Linda B. Kenney, Coleman's attorney, contains 
the following admission in the opening sentence:  "As you know, I 
represent Monmouth County in the above-captioned matter."  App. at 
148 (emphasis added).  In addition, Special Counsel O'Connor noted 
in a letter memorandum to the district court dated January 3, 1991, 
that "[t]he County of Monmouth shall rely upon the legal arguments 
and contentions contained in its supporting brief . . . ."  Id. at 
153 (emphasis added).  
         In addition to the foregoing, Assistant County Counsel 
Hrebek filed papers and motions in this action on behalf of Kaye 
and the Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office.  On April 30, 1991, 
Hrebek applied to the district court for an order granting the 
Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office a thirty-day extension to file 
an answer or a responsive pleading.  This letter listed Hrebek as 
the "Attorney for Defendants."  Id. at 611.  The district court 
granted Hrebek's motion.  Moreover, on May 28, 1991, Hrebek 
received an additional fifteen-day extension to file an answer on 
behalf of Kaye and the Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office.  
Assistant County Counsel Hrebek did not interpose the defense of 
lack of personal jurisdiction with respect to the County of 
Monmouth in any one these responsive pleadings.        
         Finally, on May 24, 1991, Gerald Dorf, Esq., entered an 
appearance on behalf of John Kaye "as an individual."  Id. at 609.  
Dorf was retained by Kaye with Monmouth County funds.  Given the 
County's pervasive involvement in the litigation of this matter and 
the County Counsel's Office's open acknowledgement that it was 
representing the County's interests, which by all appearances were 
indistinguishable from those of the Monmouth County Prosecutor's 
Office, we conclude that Monmouth County's defense of lack of 
personal jurisdiction had effectively been waived long before the 
County, seemingly as an afterthought, filed its posttrial motion to 
vacate on jurisdictional grounds.  We therefore hold that the 
County of Monmouth was properly before the district court as a 
party. 
                                B. 
         The County of Monmouth also contends that it cannot be 
held accountable for Prosecutor Kaye's actions because he is a 
state official over whom the County exercises no control.  The 
district court agreed, concluding that Prosecutor Kaye was 
controlled by the New Jersey State Attorney General.  This is an 
issue of first impression, as the New Jersey Supreme Court has yet 
to address the specific issue of whether a county prosecutor acts 
as a state or county official when making personnel decisions at 
the county level.   
         A review of related authorities leads us to conclude that 
county prosecutors in New Jersey can be characterized as having a 
dual or hybrid status.  It is well established that when county 
prosecutors execute their sworn duties to enforce the law by making 
use of all the tools lawfully available to them to combat crime, 
they act as agents of the State.  On the other hand, when county 
prosecutors are called upon to perform administrative tasks 
unrelated to their strictly prosecutorial functions, such as a 
decision whether to promote an investigator, the county prosecutor 
in effect acts on behalf of the county that is the situs of his or 
her office.  We therefore predict that the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, if presented with a case in this posture, would hold that 
county prosecutors are acting on behalf of the county when they 
make personnel decisions. 
         This conclusion requires us to reach a related issue.  
The district court determined that the application of agency 
principles, as set forth in the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision 
in Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993), provided 
the analytical framework under which Coleman's claims against the 
County of Monmouth should be scrutinized.  We disagree.   
         Neither the State nor the County of Monmouth exercised 
"control" over Prosecutor Kaye's personnel decisions.  If Lehmannwere held 
to be controlling in this context, this would lead to the 
untenable conclusion that Prosecutor Kaye was acting on behalf of 
neither the State nor the County of Monmouth when he passed over 
Coleman for promotion.  We therefore hold that the application of 
strict agency principles is inappropriate in this setting.  As the 
New Jersey LAD is intended to combat intentional discrimination, 
and given that intentional discrimination was perpetrated by county 
officials here, we predict that the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
hold that Kaye was the Monmouth County policymaker in regard to 
personnel actions in the prosecutor's office and that the County of 
Monmouth may be held liable for the acts of intentional 
discrimination that occurred. 
                                1. 
         The New Jersey Supreme Court in Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, 
Inc., 626 A.2d at 445, set forth the applicable standard to 
determine whether an employer can be held liable under the LAD when 
an employee raises a hostile environment sexual harassment claim 
against a supervisor.  Lehmann held that in this context, 
respondeat superior liability would lie if the agency principles 
set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency  219-237 (1958) 
established the existence of a master-servant relationship.  To 
determine whether such a relationship is present, the Restatement 
calls for the application of a "control test."  See id.  220(1) 
("A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs 
of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the 
performance of the services is subject to the other's control or 
right to control.");  see also Pollak v. Pino's Formal Wear & 
Tailoring, 601 A.2d 1190, 1196 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) ("[T]he 
relationship of master and servant exists whenever the employer 
retains the right to determine not only what shall be done, but how 
it shall be done.") (quoting De Monaco v. Renton, 113 A.2d 782, 
783-84 (N.J. 1955)), certif. denied, 611 A.2d 646 (N.J. 1992).     
   
         Applying Lehmann, the district court concluded that it is 
"clear . . . that the County of Monmouth does not exercise 
sufficient control over Prosecutor John Kaye to establish a master- 
servant relationship.  Rather, county prosecutors are controlled by 
the Attorney General for the State of New Jersey[,] a member of the 
New Jersey executive branch of government."  Coleman v. Kaye, No. 
91-1140, slip op. at 7 (D.N.J. May 4, 1995).  Thus, the court held 
that "the County of Monmouth cannot be held liable on a theory of 
respondeat superior for the actions of Prosecutor John Kaye."  Id.  
Since both the district court and the parties consider Lehmann to 
be the seminal case here, we will explore the issue of who can be 
said to "control" county prosecutors in New Jersey in some detail. 
         The office of county prosecutor in the State of New 
Jersey is a constitutionally established office.  The New Jersey 
Constitution provides that 
         [c]ounty prosecutors shall be nominated and 
         appointed by the Governor with the advice and 
         consent of the Senate.  Their term of office 
         shall be five years, and they shall serve 
         until the appointment and qualification of 
         their respective successors. 
 
N.J. Const., art. VII,  2, par. 1.  The specific powers and 
authority of the county prosecutor are fully set forth in Title 2A 
of the New Jersey Revised Statutes.  Each county prosecutor is 
vested "with the same powers and [is] subject to the same 
penalties, within his county, as the attorney general shall by law 
be vested with or subject to . . . ."  N.J. Stat. Ann.  2A:158-5.  
The county prosecutor's oath of office requires that the appointee 
swear to faithfully execute the duties of the office "in and for" 
the county in which he or she has been appointed.  Id.  2A:158-3.  
   
         County prosecutors in the State of New Jersey are fully 
and exclusively bestowed with appointment powers as to office staff 
and personnel.  Such appointment powers are delineated by law as 
follows:  Section 2A:158-15 authorizes a county prosecutor to 
appoint assistant prosecutors;   2A:157-2 authorizes the county 
prosecutor to appoint county detectives;   2A:158-18.1 empowers 
the prosecutor to appoint "legal assistants" in counties of the 
first class;  and  2A:157-10 provides for the appointment of 
investigators, such as Coleman, who are "to serve at [the county 
prosecutor's] pleasure . . . ."      
         Every year the board of chosen freeholders in each county 
appropriates funds to be used by the prosecutor's office.  Id.  
40:20-1.  Expenses incurred by county prosecutors in carrying out 
their statutory duty to detect, arrest, indict and convict 
offenders of the criminal law are paid by the county treasurer.  
Id.  2A:158-7.  The counties' role in financing the local 
prosecutors' offices is further exemplified by N.J. Stat. Ann.  
2A:158-16, which provides that assistant prosecutors' annual 
salaries shall "be fixed by resolution of the board of chosen 
freeholders on the recommendation of the county prosecutor . . . ." 
         Similar to the county prosecutor, the New Jersey Attorney 
General is a constitutional officer pursuant to art. V,  4,  3 of 
the New Jersey Constitution.  In furtherance of this constitutional 
authority, the New Jersey Legislature has established the 
Department of Law and Public Safety in the State's executive branch 
to be headed by the Attorney General.  N.J. Stat. Ann.  52:17B-1- 
:17B-2.  Pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann.  52:17A-4, the Attorney General 
is the State's chief law enforcement officer.  Section 52:17B-103 
provides that 
         [t]he Attorney General shall consult with and 
         advise the several county prosecutors in 
         matters relating to the duties of their office 
         and shall maintain a general supervision over 
         said county prosecutors with a view to 
         obtaining effective and uniform enforcement of 
         the criminal laws throughout the State.  He 
         may conduct periodic evaluations of each 
         county prosecutor's office including audits of 
         funds received and disbursed in the office of 
         each county prosecutor.   
 
N.J. Stat. Ann.  52:17B-103 (emphasis added).  It thus appears that 
although the Attorney General "maintain[s] a general supervision 
over . . . county prosecutors," the principal concern of that 
oversight relates to the maintenance of an effective statewide law 
enforcement policy;  i.e., "obtaining effective and uniform 
enforcement of the criminal laws throughout the State."  Id.   
         New Jersey law also empowers the Attorney General to 
intervene in the criminal matters of a county under certain 
circumstances.  Pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann.  52:17B-104, the 
Attorney General is required to prosecute criminal matters for a 
county if it has no prosecutor.  County prosecutors may also 
"request in writing the assistance of the Attorney General," but 
solely for the purpose of a "criminal investigation or proceeding."  
Id.  52:17B-105.  The Attorney General may then "take whatever 
action he deems necessary to assist the county prosecutor in the 
discharge of his duties."  Id. 
         The New Jersey Legislature has granted the Attorney 
General the discretionary authority of supersedure of a county 
prosecutor:   
         [w]henever requested in writing by the 
         Governor, the Attorney General shall, and 
         whenever requested in writing by a grand jury 
         or the board of chosen freeholders of a county 
         or the assignment judge of the superior court 
         for the county, the Attorney General may 
         supersede the county prosecutor for the 
         purpose of prosecuting all of the criminal 
         business of the State in said county, 
         intervene in any investigation, criminal 
         action, or proceeding instituted by the county 
         prosecutor, and appear for the State in any 
         court or tribunal for the purpose of 
         conducting such investigations, criminal 
         actions or proceedings as shall be necessary 
         for the protection of the rights and interests 
         of the State. 
 
              Whenever the Attorney General shall have 
         superseded a county prosecutor as aforesaid, 
         the county prosecutor, the assistant county 
         prosecutors and other members of the staff of 
         the county prosecutor shall exercise only such 
         powers and perform such duties as are required 
         of them by the Attorney General. 
 
Id.  52:17B-106 (emphasis added).  Thus, the Attorney General's 
supersedure power appears to have been bestowed with the 
understanding that it was intended to ensure the proper and 
efficient handling of the county prosecutors' "criminal business."  
Id.  This point is further amplified by the companion law of N.J. 
Stat. Ann.  52:17B-107(a), which provides that  
         [w]henever in the opinion of the Attorney 
         General the interests of the State will be 
         furthered by so doing, the Attorney General 
         may (1) supersede a county prosecutor in any 
         investigation, criminal action or proceeding, 
         (2) participate in any investigation, criminal 
         action or proceeding, or (3) initiate any 
         investigation, criminal action or proceeding.  
         In such instances, the Attorney General may 
         appear for the State in any court or tribunal 
         for the purpose of conducting such 
         investigations, criminal actions or 
         proceedings as shall be necessary to promote 
         and safeguard the public interests of the 
         State and secure the enforcement of the laws 
         of the State.   
 
Id.  17B-107(a).  Noticeably absent in the supersedure language in 
Title 52 is any reference to an intention of the part of the 
Legislature to authorize an act of supersedure simply for the 
purpose of managing routine personnel matters.  Such concerns were 
obviously not a legislative priority.   
         We recognize that in cases where the Attorney General has 
taken over the operation of a county prosecutor's office, either in 
case of supersedure or where a county has no prosecutor, the 
Attorney General would temporarily have the responsibility to make 
personnel decisions in the county office.  With the exception of 
that extraordinary situation, which has no application here, the 
Attorney General does not possess oversight authority with respect 
to the day-to-day management of the county prosecutor's office.  It 
would be an unwarranted extension of the implications of the 
Attorney General's supersedure authority to conclude that the mere 
possibility of its exercise can somehow serve to bring the conduct 
at issue in the instant case within the purview of the Attorney 
General's control.   
         The statutory and constitutional scheme that we have 
elaborated upon provides county prosecutors in the State of New 
Jersey with a substantial degree of autonomy from the State 
government in matters that do not involve the enforcement of the 
criminal laws of the State.  The decision whether to promote an 
investigator falls within the exclusive province of the county 
prosector.  We therefore hold that the district court erred in 
concluding that county prosecutors in New Jersey are agents of the 
State Attorney General when they make personnel decisions. 
                                2. 
         Nor can the County of Monmouth be said to control 
Prosecutor Kaye's employment decisions.  Indeed, attempts by 
various parties to interfere with county prosecutors' employment 
prerogatives have been rejected consistently by New Jersey courts.  
See Cetrulo v. Byrne, 157 A.2d 297 (N.J. 1960) (county board of 
chosen freeholders' appointment of a legal assistant to prosecutor 
beyond the scope of its powers);  Zamboni v. Stamler, 489 A.2d 1169 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (rejecting Union County 
detectives' challenge to a reorganization plan that created 
superior officer positions within the unclassified civil service of 
the Prosecutor's investigative staff and enabled the Prosecutor to 
appoint detectives to serve temporarily in that capacity);  cf.Bergen 
County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Bergen County 
Prosecutor, 412 A.2d 130 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) 
(upholding decision of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations 
Commission that the county prosecutor, and not the board of chosen 
freeholders, is the employer of his subordinates in the county 
office for purposes of labor relations and collective bargaining).  
 
         Moreover, New Jersey courts have held that the county 
prosecutor enjoys a significant degree of autonomy from the county 
he or she serves.  See Cetrulo, 157 A.2d at 301 ("The Legislature 
as well as the courts have long recognized the strong policy 
considerations which dictate that since the county prosecutor is 
charged with heavy enforcement responsibilities he must be given 
broad powers to appoint his own personnel.");  Mercer County Bd. of 
Freeholders v. Mercer County Prosecutor, 412 A.2d 809, 810 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (New Jersey statute that permits the 
county prosecutor to go to the county's assignment judge for 
authorization of funding in excess of that approved by the county 
freeholders "indicates a legislative intent to place the prosecutor 
in a dominant position with relation to the freeholders for the 
purpose of maintaining his integrity and effectiveness");  Ruvoldt 
v. Clark, 499 A.2d 247, 250 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983) 
(holding that the county has no control over a Prosecutor's 
nonsalary expenditures that do not exceed his budget because "it 
would be incongruous to permit county government to control the 
operations and functions of the Prosecutor, a constitutional 
officer entrusted with awesome duties of `vast importance to the 
public'"). 
         Both the County of Monmouth and the New Jersey State 
Attorney General's Office, which filed an amicus brief, make 
convincing arguments that under the existing New Jersey 
constitutional and statutory scheme, neither the Attorney General 
nor the County of Monmouth can truly be said to "control" the 
personnel decisions of Prosecutor Kaye.  Therefore, if Lehmannprovides the 
appropriate test, we would have to conclude that no 
governmental entity in the State of New Jersey can under any 
circumstances be held accountable for a county prosecutor's acts of 
intentional discrimination, no matter how flagrant and persistent 
the violations are, because county prosecutors are neither state 
nor county officials.  We do not believe that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would countenance such an untoward result.   
         The New Jersey Legislature and the New Jersey Supreme 
Court have expressed a persistent and strong commitment to 
eradicating discrimination in the workplace.  See Lehmann, 626 A.2d 
at 454 ("The purpose of the LAD is to eradicate discrimination, 
whether intentional or unintentional.");  Grigoletti v. Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp., 570 A.2d 903, 911 (N.J. 1990) ("[T]he LAD 
represents a strong commitment to counteract discrimination 
attributable to sex or gender, an evil that is felt acutely in 
terms of employment and economic treatment.");  Fuchilla v. Layman, 
537 A.2d 652, 660 (N.J.) (citing New Jersey's "clear public policy 
. . . to abolish discrimination in the work place"), cert. denied, 
488 U.S. 826, 109 S. Ct. 75 (1988);  Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. 
of Trustees, 389 A.2d 465, 478 (N.J. 1978) (noting the "repugnant" 
nature of sex discrimination and that "New Jersey has always been 
in the vanguard in the fight to eradicate the cancer of unlawful 
discrimination of all types from our society").   
         The New Jersey Supreme Court has further stated that the 
LAD, "as remedial social legislation, . . . is deserving of a 
liberal construction."  Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 538 A.2d 
794, 802 (N.J. 1988).  The supreme court views "the issue of the 
scope of an employer's liability for compensatory and punitive 
damages" under the LAD to be "a question of public policy," in 
which the most critical underlying consideration is "which position 
provides the most effective intervention and prevention of 
employment discrimination."  Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 465.     
         The extension of Lehmann's agency principles to Coleman's 
sex discrimination suit against the County of Monmouth is logically 
unacceptable because county prosecutors are clearly government 
officials who, reason dictates, must be acting on behalf of a some 
governmental entity when they make personnel decisions.  The agency 
paradigm fails here because it would require us to reach the 
specious conclusion that Prosecutor Kaye was not acting under the 
authority of any state governmental body, either state or county, 
when he passed Coleman over for promotion.  We must therefore look 
to New Jersey constitutional, statutory and decisional law to 
determine which level of state government the county prosecutor 
"belongs" when making personnel decisions. 
                                3. 
         Our review of New Jersey Supreme Court decisions that 
have discussed the relation of the county prosecutor to the State 
Attorney General is both instructive and supportive of our 
conclusion that county prosecutors are acting as county officials 
when they make employment decisions.  The issue of the county 
prosecutor's role in relation to the Attorney General was discussed 
in great detail in Morss v. Forbes, 132 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1957).  The 
question presented in Morss was whether the New Jersey Legislature 
had the authority to compel a county prosecutor to disclose certain 
information and records relating to wiretapping activities 
authorized by his office.  Morss, the Union County Prosecutor, 
resisted these demands, arguing that by compelling "the disclosure 
of information which the prosecutor has deemed to be confidential, 
the [Legislative] Committee is transgressing upon the doctrine of 
separation of powers and actually invading the exclusive province 
of a coordinate body."  Id. at 11. 
         The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected this argument, 
holding that the county prosecutor could be required to turn the 
wiretap information over to the state legislature.  In reaching 
this conclusion, the court analyzed the question of "the role . . 
. the [county] prosecutor plays in the governmental structure."  
Id. at 14.  In so doing, the Morss court described the role of the 
State Attorney General and county prosecutors in relation to each 
other within the framework established by the New Jersey 
Constitution: 
              By provision of the Constitution of 1947, 
         both the attorney general and the county 
         prosecutor are constitutional officers.  Both 
         are appointed by the Governor with the advice 
         and consent of the Senate.  The attorney 
         general serves a term coexistent in length 
         with that of the Governor, but the county 
         prosecutor serves for five years, or until the 
         appointment and qualification of a successor.  
         The attorney general, as head of the 
         Department of Law and Public Safety, is within 
         the executive department (Art. V, Sec. IV, 
         par. 3), but the provision for the appointment 
         of prosecutors is found in Art. VII, Sec. II, 
         par.1, 'Public Officers and Employees.' 
 
Id. at 16-17.  The supreme court concluded that "[t]hese 
constitutional provisions fail to furnish any guide or standard 
with respect to the nature of powers, rights, duties and 
responsibilities of either officer, and, consequently, the task of 
definition is left to the Legislature."  Id. at 17.      
         Reviewing the applicable statutes that govern the 
relationship between the county prosecutor and the state 
government, the Morss court noted that despite the Attorney 
General's statutory power of supersession, "the presently existing 
situation under the Constitution of 1947 . . . strongly reaffirms 
that the [county] prosecutors are largely independent of control by 
the attorney general . . . ."  Id. at 16.  The court noted the 
demonstrable lack of a "chain of command between the attorney 
general and the county prosecutors."  Id. at 17.  Evaluating the 
powers and responsibilities of the Attorney General and the county 
prosecutors within their respective governmental spheres led the 
court to recognize "the essential independence of the two offices 
and the disparateness of their powers."  Id. 
         The Morss court expressed serious reservations as to 
whether the New Jersey statutory scheme "imports a close 
supervisory relationship between the attorney general and the 
county prosecutors."  Id.  Nor did "it appear that the Governor is 
responsible for the daily functioning of the prosecutor's office."  
Id. at 18.  The court also attached significance to the fact that 
county prosecutors "receive their remuneration from the county."  
Id.     
         Although the Morss court paid due regard to the 
governor's power to supersede the county prosecutor's authority, it 
ultimately concluded that "the existence of this power of 
supersession does not bring the prosecutors so directly under the 
influence of the Governor that they automatically qualify as full- 
fledged members of the state executive branch."  Id.  Summing up on 
its lengthy discussion on this issue, the supreme court concluded 
that 
         although there is confusion and uncertainty  
         with regard to [the county prosecutor's] 
         status by reason of the fact that his office 
         is created by the Constitution, he is 
         appointed by the Governor with the advice and 
         consent of the Senate, the Legislature 
         prescribes his duties, while he is paid by the 
         county, . . . there is nevertheless little 
         doubt but that the executive chain of command 
         is not sufficiently prominent to enable the 
         prosecutor to claim any high prerogative which 
         might be enjoyed by the state executive with 
         respect to withholding information from the 
         Legislature. . . . The prosecutor is primarily 
         a local official. 
 
Id. at 18-19 (emphasis added).  The Morss court's pronouncement on 
the locus of the county prosecutor's authority supports our 
conclusion that county prosecutors act as county officials when 
they make personnel decisions.  Morss implies that absent direct 
intervention by the State, county prosecutors act as county 
officials when they are called upon to make administrative 
decisions on a local level. 
         One of the authorities upon which the district court 
relied in concluding that Prosecutor Kaye had acted as a state 
official when he decided not to promote Coleman was Justice 
Pashman's partial concurrence and dissent in In re Ringwood Fact 
Finding Committee, 324 A.2d 1, 5-15 (N.J. 1974) (Pashman, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  In Ringwood, Justice 
Pashman declared that "[t]his State has always recognized the 
prosecutor's primacy as a representative of the executive branch."  
Id. at 8.  Justice Pashman also attempted to limit the scope of 
Morss by citing the alleged implications of the New Jersey 
Legislature's enactment of the Criminal Justice Act of 1970.  As 
explained by Justice Pashman, this state statute had "consolidated 
many previous statutes dealing with the attorney general's and 
prosecutor's authority in an attempt to encourage more cooperation 
and coordination among law enforcement authorities in combating 
organized crime."  Id. at 10.  Justice Pashman opined that this 
development had "altered the relationship of county prosecutors to 
the executive branch" and thereby "render[ed] inapplicable much of 
the discussion [in Morss]."  Id. at 11. 
         Justice Pashman's opinion in Ringwood provides no 
significant support for the proposition that county prosecutors in 
New Jersey always act as state officials irrespective of the duties 
that they are called upon to perform.  In addition to not speaking 
for the majority of the court, Justice Pashman confined his 
discussion to the classic law enforcement functions of the 
prosecutor's office, as opposed to the day-to-day personnel 
decisions that are at issue in the instant case.  The fact that the 
prosecutor "[i]n his county . . . is the foremost representative of 
the executive branch of government in the enforcement of the 
criminal law" is not disputed here.  State v. Winne, 96 A.2d 63, 72 
(N.J. 1953) (emphasis added).  What we must address is the county 
prosecutor's role in the promotion process on the local level, an 
issue separate and apart from the prosecutor's well-recognized 
executive investigatory and prosecutorial functions. 
         The New Jersey Supreme Court revisited the relation of 
the county prosecutor to the executive branch of state government 
in Cashen v. Spann, 334 A.2d 8 (N.J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 829, 
96 S. Ct. 48 (1975).  Cashen involved a search of a private 
residence based upon a search warrant affidavit that admittedly was 
"grossly erroneous in significant respects."  Id. at 10.  The 
question presented was whether the Morris County Prosecutor and the 
detectives who prepared the affidavit, who were defendants in this 
action, were acting as agents of the State when their allegedly 
tortious conduct had arisen out of the investigation of criminal 
activity.  The Cashen court held that "in the context of this case, 
the prosecutor and the detectives are to be considered as agents of 
the State and not the county."  Id. at 14.   
         The Cashen court gave no indication of limiting or 
otherwise distinguishing the court's previous decision in Morss, 
which had recognized the county prosecutor's broad discretion in 
performing local administrative functions and great degree of 
independence from the State government in many respects.  As such, 
the supreme court was careful to ensure that its holding would not 
be read too broadly: 
         We wish to make it clear . . . that our 
         resolution of this issue is limited to the 
         factual circumstances here presented.  We find 
         it appropriate to regard the defendant 
         officials as State agents where the alleged 
         tortious conduct arose out of the 
         investigation of criminal activity, but we 
         express no opinion on the question of whether 
         the prosecutor or his detectives can be 
         considered State or county employees for other 
         purposes.  We also leave for another day the 
         question of whether a county may be held 
         vicariously liable for the conduct of a 
         prosecutor or his detectives in other 
         circumstances. 
 
Id.  (citation omitted).  The issue that the Cashen court reserved 
on is before this court today. 
         In Dunne v. Fireman's Fund American Insurance Co., 353 
A.2d 508 (N.J. 1976), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that county 
detectives whose duties consisted of performing services 
exclusively for the prosecutor were "employees of the county" 
within the meaning of an insurance policy affording coverage to 
county employees acting within the scope of their duties.  Applying 
reasoning that could apply equally in the prosecutorial setting, 
the court noted that "in preparing and executing the affidavit upon 
which the search warrant was based and conducting the search, [the 
investigators] were `agents of the State.'  At the same time they 
were also employees of and there existed an employer-employee 
relationship with the County."  Id. at 512. 
         The Dunne court stated that "[c]ounty prosecutors' 
detectives possess a hybrid status."  Id. at 511.  Our review of 
New Jersey law has convinced us that the same can be said about 
county prosecutors.  When county prosecutors engage in classic law 
enforcement and investigative functions, they act as officers of 
the State.  But where, as here, the county prosecutor decides 
whether an employee at his or her office is worthy of an open 
promotion, the county prosecutor is performing an administrative 
function on the local level entirely unrelated to the duties 
involved in criminal prosecution.  We therefore conclude that 
Prosecutor Kaye was acting as a local, county official when he 
denied Coleman's applications for promotion. 
         Prosecutor Kaye's constitutional and statutory authority 
went far beyond that of a typical supervisory employee.  Kaye 
possessed final policymaking authority under state law to manage 
the internal affairs of his office.  The New Jersey LAD is intended 
to redress intentional discrimination, Goodman v. London Metal 
Exch., Inc., 429 A.2d 341, 347 (N.J. 1981), and it is 
uncontroverted that the jury verdict against the County of Monmouth 
was supported by multiple findings of intentional discrimination.  
We hold, therefore, that the discriminatory acts of Kaye and his 
subordinates may be imputed to the County of Monmouth since Kaye 
was the final policymaking authority acting on behalf of Monmouth 
County in the prosecutor's office.  We therefore conclude that the 
compensatory and punitive damages awards levied against the County 
of Monmouth should not have been vacated on either of the grounds 
upon which the district court relied. 
           
                               IV. 
         Having rejected the two grounds upon which the district 
court vacated the jury verdict against the County of Monmouth, we 
now address the merits of the other claims asserted by the parties 
to this action.  Although Coleman's complaint stated claims against 
the County of Monmouth and Prosecutor Kaye under 42 U.S.C.  1983, 
New Jersey LAD and Title VII, the verdict sheets issued to the jury 
provided no space for the jury to indicate which causes of action 
formed the basis of the defendants' liability.  Furthermore, for 
reasons that are not clear from the record, the jury was not 
instructed on all of the claims that were asserted in Coleman's 
complaint.  No objections, however, were raised by any of the 
parties as to the content of the instructions, despite the district 
court's apparent decision not to instruct the jury on the elements 
of a number of the claims set forth in Coleman's complaint.  With 
these considerations in mind, we will now address the other issues 
that must be resolved in this case. 
 
                                A. 
         The County of Monmouth relies upon the conclusions of the 
district court as to the service of process issue and the county 
prosecutor's status vis-a-vis the Attorney General in support of 
its argument that the issue of compensatory damages should not have 
been submitted to the jury.  We have already rejected the merits of 
these claims and need not address them again.  We therefore 
conclude that the compensatory damages award of $15,000 imposed on 
the County of Monmouth must be reinstated. 
         An overwhelming portion of the damages award that the 
jury assessed against the County of Monmouth ($350,000 out of a 
total of $365,000) was allocated to punitive damages.  As  1983 
plaintiffs may not obtain punitive damages against a county 
defendant, City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 
101 S. Ct. 2748 (1981), the jury must have found implicitly that 
the County, through Kaye, had violated the New Jersey LAD.  The 
jury's findings that Prosecutor Kaye and/or his subordinates 
intentionally discriminated against Coleman on three occasions 
provides a sufficient foundation to support a jury award of 
punitive damages against the County of Monmouth.  We therefore 
conclude that the jury award of punitive damages against Monmouth 
County must also be reinstated.    
                                B. 
         The jury found that Prosecutor Kaye intentionally 
discriminated against Coleman by not promoting her to sergeant in 
both June of 1990 and October of 1990.  Based upon these findings, 
the jury awarded Coleman $10,000 in compensatory damages for the 
"pain, suffering, humiliation and mental anguish" she endured as a 
result of Kaye's actions.  App. at 396.  The jury also awarded 
Coleman an additional $50,000 in punitive damages against Kaye.  
$15,000 of this award was premised on the first act of intentional 
discrimination in June of 1990.  An additional $35,000 was assessed 
for the second incident in October of 1990. 
         As to the various civil rights claims that Coleman 
asserted in her complaint against Prosecutor Kaye, the district 
court instructed the jury, without objection, only upon what it 
would be required to find in order to hold Kaye liable for 
compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C.  1983.  
Accordingly, we will analyze Prosecutor Kaye's arguments under 
controlling  1983 case law.  We conclude that the jury's finding 
that Prosecutor Kaye intentionally discriminated against Coleman on 
two occasions is supported by the record and provides ample 
justification for its award of compensatory and punitive damages 
against Kaye under  1983. 
         Prosecutor Kaye challenges the jury award of compensatory 
and punitive damages on the following grounds.  First, Kaye argues 
that his Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law should 
have been granted by the district court because no "actual injury" 
occurred here and that  1983 does not permit plaintiffs to recover 
compensatory damages for the type of harm that Coleman is alleged 
to have suffered.  Second, Kaye argues there is insufficient 
evidence on this record to support a jury finding that he 
discriminated against Coleman.  Kaye also makes the related 
contention that the record is critically deficient of evidence to 
support an award of either compensatory or punitive damages against 
Kaye in his individual capacity.  We will address these issues 
seriatim. 
         Prosecutor Kaye argues that Supreme Court's decision in 
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S. Ct. 1042 (1978), precludes an 
award of compensatory damages for the personal humiliation and 
mental anguish Coleman is alleged to have endured as a consequence 
of Kaye's acts of intentional discrimination.  The Supreme Court's 
decision in Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 
299, 106 S. Ct. 2537 (1986), however, holds otherwise.  The 
Stachura Court expressly held that "compensatory damages may 
include not only out-of-pocket loss and other monetary harms, but 
also such injuries as `impairment of reputation . . ., personal 
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.'"  Id. at 306, 106 
S. Ct. at 2543 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 
350, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3012 (1974)).  We reject Kaye's argument that 
Coleman did not suffer an "actual injury" because a reasonable jury 
could credit Coleman's testimony as to the personal anguish she 
suffered as a result of being passed over for promotion. 
         Prosecutor Kaye's evidentiary insufficiency argument is 
similarly without merit.  The gist of Kaye's argument is that he 
cannot be held personally liable for intentional discrimination 
because he merely rubber stamped the suggestions of his 
subordinates and had no awareness of the problems that Coleman was 
facing.  We find ample evidence in the record to reject this 
argument.  A reasonable jury could conclude that Kaye, despite his 
awareness of Coleman's qualifications and the serious allegations 
of sex discrimination that she had raised, nonetheless chose to 
exercise his final policymaking authority in employment matters in 
a legally impermissible manner.     
         After Coleman was denied a promotion in May of 1989, she 
suspected that she had been discriminated against and initially 
sought redress from her superiors in the Monmouth County 
Prosecutor's Office.  After her May 1989 rejection, Coleman 
prepared a memorandum to Prosecutor Kaye, dated May 24, 1989, which 
alluded to her suspicions that she had not been promoted because of 
her sex.  Coleman felt aggrieved because she perceived that "men 
with less experience and seniority were considered and promoted."  
App. at 513.  In her May 24, 1989 memorandum to Prosecutor Kaye, 
Coleman wrote that 
              [t]hroughout my entire career of over 
         sixteen years in Law Enforcement, I have never 
         believed that a person should be promoted 
         based upon race, sex, creed or national 
         origin.  However, the recent promotion of 
         fourteen men, four with less time in the 
         Prosecutor's Office and one who you passed 
         over nineteen people to promote in my field of 
         training and expertise, has prompted me to ask 
         the following question: 
 
              What exactly have I done, or not done, to 
         warrant being passed over or not even 
         considered for promotion? 
 
Id. at 514.  Coleman hand delivered this memorandum to Chief of 
Investigations Frank R. Licitra, who later informed Coleman that he 
had personally submitted it to Kaye.  Prosecutor Kaye never replied 
to Coleman's inquiry.    
         Coleman sent Kaye a follow-up memorandum, dated November 
6, 1989, concerning her failure to be promoted in May of 1989.  In 
the November 6, 1989 memorandum, Coleman asked Kaye to "[p]lease 
advise [her] what steps [he] intend[ed] to take to remedy this 
discrimination."  Id. at 513.  Once again, Kaye did not respond.  
Moreover, there is no indication in the record that Coleman's 
allegations of discrimination were ever investigated. 
         Prosecutor Kaye can be held liable under  1983 if he had 
actual knowledge of discriminatory conduct and acquiesced in it.  
As we explained in Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d 
Cir. 1988), "[p]ersonal involvement can be shown through 
allegations . . . of actual knowledge and acquiescence."  Since 
Coleman had presented her concerns to Kaye in writing about the 
discriminatory treatment that she was enduring, and Kaye chose to 
take no action whatsoever, the pattern of discriminatory conduct 
that Coleman alleges took place at the Monmouth County Prosecutor's 
Office at this time takes on added significance.   
         Coleman presented evidence at trial that called into 
question the manner in which she had been evaluated in comparison 
to her male counterparts, who had also applied for promotions on 
the occasions in question.  For example, Chief Licitra prepared 
Coleman's performance evaluation for the period of November 1, 1988 
through April 30, 1989.  Although Coleman was rated as 
"outstanding" in five of six categories, and was also given a 
"plus" or "strong" rating in twenty-nine of thirty-one 
subcategories, she received an overall rating of only "competent."  
App. at 521.  Specifically, in the category of "Investigative 
Ability," Coleman received four pluses (signifying a strength) and 
two checks (indicating standard performance).  This was the only 
category of the six evaluated in which Coleman received a 
"competent" rating. 
         By way of contrast, Michael Campbell, an investigator who 
was ultimately selected for promotion over Coleman, rated 
"outstanding" in only one of the six categories evaluated, that of 
"Investigative Ability."  Although Campbell was also given an 
overall rating of "competent," he received an evaluation of 
"outstanding" in investigative ability, despite the fact that he 
had been rated as "strong" in only two of the six subcategories 
that are considered under this heading.  Id. at 522.  Furthermore, 
in stark contrast to Coleman, Campbell received a "plus" or 
"strong" rating in only three of the thirty-one subcategories upon 
which candidates for promotion were evaluated. 
         Coleman also introduced evidence at trial that procedures 
utilized by the Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office to evaluate 
candidates for promotion were altered in a manner that seriously 
hindered her efforts to obtain a promotion.  Coleman alleges that 
General Order 90-3, promulgated on April 19, 1990, was intended to 
provide a pretextual justification for the denial of future 
promotions.  Order 90-3 established as a promotion criterion the 
length of time served in a specific unit, as opposed to seniority 
as an investigator, which had been a promotion criterion under the 
previous system.  This new evaluation process had the effect of 
giving less-experienced male investigators a seniority advantage 
over Coleman when promotion decisions were to be made. 
         The jury found Coleman's testimony to be credible and her 
arguments to be convincing.  Since Coleman presented her concerns 
to Prosecutor Kaye via memoranda on two occasions and received no 
response, a reasonable jury could properly reject Kaye's arguments 
that he had no actual knowledge and was not involved in the 
discrimination that occurred.  Viewing this "evidence in the light 
most favorable to [Coleman] and giving [her] the advantage of every 
fair and reasonable inference," Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco 
Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993), we conclude that there is 
sufficient evidence in this record to support the jury's finding of 
liability against Prosecutor Kaye in his individual capacity. 
         Prosecutor Kaye also alleges that there was no legally 
sufficient basis from which a jury could award punitive damages.  
The jury found that Kaye had intentionally discriminated against 
Coleman on two occasions.  On the verdict sheet, the jury assessed 
$15,000 in punitive damages for the first violation in June of 1990 
and $35,000 for the second violation in October of 1990.  We 
conclude that the jury's finding of two acts of intentional 
discrimination, after having been put on notice of a prior act of 
discrimination against the same plaintiff, evinces the requisite 
"reckless or callous indifference" to Coleman's federally protected 
rights.  Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1640 
(1983).  We will therefore uphold the jury's imposition of a 
$50,000 punitive damages award against Prosecutor Kaye in his 
individual capacity.   
 
                                V. 
         Having prevailed on her  1983 claim against Prosecutor 
Kaye, Coleman is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees 
under 42 U.S.C.  1988.  On September 8, 1995, the district court 
issued a memorandum opinion discussing the attorneys' fees issue.  
Coleman v. Kaye, No. 91-1140 (D.N.J. Sept. 8, 1995).  Since by that 
time the district court had dismissed the County of Monmouth as a 
party to this action, Prosecutor Kaye was required to pay the 
entire fee award.  After reviewing Coleman's attorneys' fee 
application, the district court reduced substantially the hourly 
rates that Coleman's attorneys had sought, noting that 
"[t]hroughout the entire adjudication of this matter, this Court 
has had a significant opportunity to assess the skills and 
experience of the attorneys involved.  As a result, this Court will 
reduce plaintiff's counsels' hourly rates to `rates prevailing in 
the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably 
comparable skill, experience, and reputation.'"  Id. at 5 (quoting 
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990)).  The 
district court ordered that Prosecutor Kaye would be liable to pay 
Coleman $101,184 in attorneys' fees, in addition to $3,968.92 in 
costs.  Coleman argues that the district court abused its 
discretion when it reduced the hourly rates sought by her 
attorneys, based upon its conclusory observations as to "the skills 
and experience of the attorneys involved."  Coleman, No. 91-1140, 
slip op. at 5.  We agree. 
                                A. 
         As we explained in Silberman v. Bogle, 683 F.2d 62, 65 
(3d Cir. 1982), our standard of review in this context "is a narrow 
one.  We can find an abuse of discretion if no reasonable man would 
adopt the district court's view."  The district court's discretion, 
however, is not without bounds.  We have held that a district court 
may not set attorneys' fees based upon a generalized sense of what 
is customary or proper, but rather must rely upon the record.  
Cunningham v. City of McKeesport, 807 F.2d 49, 52-53 (3d Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 107 S. Ct. 2179 (1987).  It is 
this requirement that the district court failed to satisfy.   
            
         As the Supreme Court explained in Blum v. Stenson, 465 
U.S. 886, 895, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1547 (1984), "[t]he statute and 
legislative history establish that `reasonable fees' under  1988 
are to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in 
the relevant community . . . ."  See Student Pub. Interest Research 
Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. AT & T Bell Labs., 842 F.2d 1436, 1442 
(3d Cir. 1988) ("Market rates have served as the prime focus of our 
inquiry in ascertaining reasonable attorneys' fees.").  Although 
Coleman's attorneys submitted affidavits in support of their 
assessment of the prevailing market rate, the district court did 
not address this evidence.  The record is not clear whether any 
affidavits were filed in opposition to the hourly rates claimed by 
Coleman's attorneys.  In fact, the district court failed to cite 
any record evidence in support of its conclusion that the fees 
requested by Coleman's attorneys were unreasonable.   
          
         The number of hours that Coleman's attorneys reasonably 
expended in litigating this matter is not in dispute.  On this 
record, however, "the findings of the district court purporting to 
justify a reduction in the fee request are not specific and lack 
the evidentiary basis to counter the . . . affidavit of plaintiff's 
counsel detailing the[ir] . . . billing rate[s]."  Cunningham, 807 
F.2d at 52.  We therefore hold that if the hourly rates are 
contested, the district court on remand must conduct a hearing in 
order to calculate reasonable hourly rates "according to the 
prevailing market rates in the relevant community."  Rode, 892 F.2d 
at 1183.  We express no opinion as to whether the hourly rates 
sought by Coleman's attorneys are reasonable, in the absence of a 
more fully developed record. 
 
                                B. 
         Prosecutor Kaye argues that he alone should not have been 
required to pay the entire amount of the prevailing party's 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this matter.  We agree.  As 
we have held that the jury verdict against the County of Monmouth 
is to be reinstated, Prosecutor Kaye should not have been ordered 
to pay the entire amount of the lodestar figure plus costs.  It is 
a well-established principle that when multiple defendants are held 
to be liable in a civil rights action, the proper course of action 
for a district court is to allocate responsibility for the payment 
of fees among the responsible parties.  See, e.g., Vargas v. Hudson 
County Bd. of Elections, 949 F.2d 665, 677 (3d Cir. 1992).  Under 
this analysis, "each defendant must bear the prevailing plaintiff's 
fees for time spent on matters clearly related to the claims made 
against that defendant."  Williamsburg Fair Hous. Committee v. 
Ross-Rodney Hous. Corp., 599 F. Supp. 509, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).  On 
remand, the district court must apportion the hours that it has 
found to have been reasonably spent by Coleman's attorneys on this 
case between the claims asserted against Prosecutor Kaye and those 
against the County of Monmouth.  
         A further complication must also be resolved.  Our 
discussion of the counsel fees claim asserted against Prosecutor 
Kaye focused exclusively upon his responsibility to pay reasonable 
attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C.  1988.  This analysis was 
appropriate because, as to defendant Kaye, Coleman's  1983 claim 
was the only theory of liability upon which the jury was 
instructed.  The County of Monmouth, however, was found to have 
violated the New Jersey LAD.  Coleman argues that the district 
court erred in not awarding a contingency fee enhancement under the 
attorneys' fees provision of the LAD.  To evaluate this claim, we 
must review how the counsel fees provision of LAD has been 
interpreted by the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
         The New Jersey approach to the issue of contingency 
enhancement under the LAD is a marked departure from the Supreme 
Court's interpretation and application of federal fee-shifting 
statutes.  The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision Rendine v. 
Pantzer, 661 A.2d 1202 (N.J. 1995), addressed in a thorough and 
comprehensive manner the issue of the propriety of contingency 
enhancements under the fee-shifting provisions of the LAD.  SeeN.J. Stat. 
Ann.  10:5-27.1.  The Rendine court elected to depart 
from Supreme Court precedent on this issue and thereby established 
a rule that strongly favors the award of contingency enhancements 
to prevailing parties under the LAD. 
         In City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 112 S. Ct. 
2638 (1992), the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the 
attorneys' fees provisions of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 
U.S.C.  6972(e), and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 
U.S.C.  1365(d).  Both these statutes contain language that is 
comparable to that of 42 U.S.C.  1988.  See 505 U.S. at 562, 112 
S. Ct. at 2641.  The Court rejected the prevailing parties' 
argument that they were entitled to a contingency enhancement, 
holding that such relief "is not permitted under the fee-shifting 
statutes at issue."  Id. at 567, 112 S. Ct. at 2643-44.      
         The New Jersey Supreme Court in Rendine expressly 
rejected the reasoning and analysis of the Dague majority, holding 
that "a counsel fee awarded under a fee-shifting statute cannot be 
`reasonable' unless the lodestar, calculated as if the attorney's 
compensation were guaranteed irrespective of result, is adjusted to 
reflect the actual risk that the attorney will not receive payment 
if the suit does not succeed."  661 A.2d at 1228.  The Rendinecourt opined 
"that contingency enhancements in fee-shifting cases 
ordinarily should range between five and fifty-percent of the 
lodestar fee, with the enhancement in typical contingency cases 
ranging between twenty and thirty-five percent of the lodestar."  
Id. at 1231.  Thus, the district court on remand must also 
determine the appropriate degree of contingency enhancement that 
the County of Monmouth will be required to pay under the principles 
set forth in Rendine.       
 
                               VI. 
         Coleman's final claim is that she, as a prevailing tort 
plaintiff under New Jersey law, is entitled to an award of 
prejudgment interest under the New Jersey Court Rules.  
Specifically, N.J. Ct. R. 4:42--11(b) provides in relevant part 
that: 
         Except where provided by statute with respect 
         to a public entity or employee, and except as 
         otherwise provided by law, the court shall, in 
         tort actions, . . . include in the judgment 
         simple interest, calculated as hereafter 
         provided, from the date of the institution of 
         the action or from a date 6 months after the 
         date the cause of action arises, whichever is 
         later, provided that in exceptional cases the 
         court may suspend the running of such 
         prejudgment interest. . . . 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  Awards of prejudgment interest, when 
appropriate, apply only to awards of compensatory damages.  SeeBelinski v. 
Goodman, 354 A.2d 92, 96 (N.J.Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1976).   
         We reject Coleman's claim of entitlement to prejudgment 
interest against either Prosecutor Kaye or the County of Monmouth.  
As to Prosecutor Kaye, the jury's instructions were limited to 
Coleman's federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C.  1983.  As 
such, Kaye could only have been held to be liable under federal 
law.  Therefore, prejudgment interest cannot be awarded against 
Prosecutor Kaye under New Jersey Law.   
         Nor can prejudgment interest be assessed against the 
County of Monmouth.  The court rule that Coleman invokes expressly 
provides that prejudgment interest will not be awarded against a 
public entity "[e]xcept where provided by statute . . . ."  N.J. 
Ct. R. 4:42--11(b).  There is no statutory authorization in New 
Jersey for such an award.  To the contrary, as the New Jersey 
Appellate Division stated in Maynard v. Mine Hill Township, 582 
A.2d 315, 318 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), the New Jersey Tort 
Claims Act "specifically prohibits prejudgment interest against 
government tortfeasors."  See N.J. Stat. Ann.  59:9-2(a) ("No 
interest shall accrue prior to the entry of judgment against a 
public entity or public employee."). 
 
                               VII. 
         We will affirm the order of the district court to the 
extent that it denied Prosecutor Kaye's motion for a judgment as a 
matter of law.  We will reverse the order of the district court 
vacating the jury verdict against the County of Monmouth and order 
the judgment entered against the County be reinstated.  If on 
remand the defendants elect to challenge the hourly rates put forth 
by Coleman's attorneys, a hearing must be held to determine a 
reasonable hourly rate for their services.  Once the lodestar is 
calculated, responsibility for paying the attorneys' fees award is 
to be allocated among the defendants on a percentage basis.  After 
the responsibility for the payment of attorneys' fees has been 
properly apportioned, the district court must also consider the 
appropriate degree of contingency enhancement to apply to the 
County of Monmouth's portion of the fee award under New Jersey law. 
         Costs taxed to the County Prosecutor's Office of the 
County of Monmouth and John Kaye.             
     
               
                   
